This gap provided space for marshalling the legionaries for battle and kept the troop area out of enemy missile range. Nevertheless, an advance by its left wing drove back the Romans, who counterattacked on the right flank and made some progress against a somewhat disorganized Macedonian left. Marcellinus's commentary also sharply contrasts the fighting spirit of the Persian infantrymen with those of Rome, stating that they had "aversion to pitched infantry battles". Flank and reconnaissance elements were also deployed to provide the usual covering security. Publius asserts that the pilum was of Samnite origin, and the shield was based on Greek design. Some of the best leaders come from both eras, including Marius, Sulla, Scipio, Caesar, Trajan and others. These tools would be used for building castra (camps). Unlike earlier training, the wooden weapons used for armatura were the same weight as the weapons they emulated. (2005) Gilliver et al. Smaller detachments waged more personal and smaller scale, yet intense operations against tribal foes on the Rhine and Danubian frontiers. Intercepted messages during the Second Punic War for example were an intelligence coup for the Romans, and enabled them to dispatch two armies to find and destroy Hasdrubal's Carthaginian force, preventing his reinforcement of Hannibal. In the first line, the hastati left modest gaps between each maniple. The Romans, however, were to learn from their mistakes. Phalanxes facing the legion were vulnerable to the more flexible Roman "checkerboard" deployment, which provided each fighting man a good chunk of personal space to engage in close order fighting. The Limitanei defended the borders of the Empire from small attacks and raids by the Germanic peoples. They carried around tools such as a dolabra, a wooden stave, and a shallow wicker basket. Once the main gate was opened or the walls breached, the cavalry and other cohorts entered the city to finish off the remaining defenders. The manipular system allowed engaging every kind of enemy even in rough terrain, because the legion had both flexibility and toughness according to the deployment of its lines. These included not only the usual heavy infantrymen, cavalry and light infantry but also various elite units, medium armed groups, foreign contingents with their own styles and shock units of war-elephants.
Colleen McCullough, (2003) Caesar, p 303417, Rome at war.
Each legion marched as a distinct formation and was accompanied by its own individual baggage train. As one historian notes about the persisting strategy: In their battles against a wide variety of opponents, Rome's ruthless persistence, greater resources and stronger organization wore down their opponents over time. Ironically, in Rome's final battles (the Western half of the empire) the defeats suffered were substantially inflicted by infantry forces (many fighting dismounted).[93]. Military forces based primarily on citizen heavy infantry with tribal beginnings and early use of phalanx-type elements (see, Growing sophistication as Roman hegemony expanded outside of Italy and into North Africa, Western Europe, Greece, Anatolia, and South-west Asia (see, Continued refinement, standardization, and streamlining in the period associated with, Continued expansion, flexibility, and sophistication from the end of the, Growing barbarization, turmoil, and weakening of the heavy infantry units in favour of. [5][6]Livy states that soldiers would "open" the maniple in order to let the soldiers fight well. During the march, the commander would try to boost the morale of his soldiers. [14], After conditioning, the recruits underwent weapons training; this was deemed of such importance that weapons instructors generally received double rations. The initiative of such men played a key part in Roman success. Nevertheless, the in-depth Roman formation allowed adjustments to be made, and the continual application of forwarding pressure made long-term combat a hazardous proposition for the Gauls. The arrival of the two rear legions that had been guarding the baggage reinforced the Roman lines.
The Gallic city was surrounded by massive double walls penning in defenders, and keeping out relieving attackers. As the battle progressed, the massive physical and mental stress intensified. Nevertheless, some historians emphasize that the final demise of Rome was due to military defeat, however plausible (or implausible) the plethora of theories advanced by some scholars, ranging from declining tax bases, to class struggle, to mass lead poisoning. Surprisingly for such an infantry centred battle, Caesar relied heavily on cavalry forces to counter Gallic sorties. [34] Some writers maintain that in Caesar's armies the use of the quincunx and its gaps seems to have declined, and his legions generally deployed in three unbroken lines as shown above, with four cohorts in front, and three apiece in the echeloned order. Rome had a vast manpower surplus far outnumbering Hannibal that gave them more options and flexibility. When the Romans faced phalangite armies, the legions often deployed the velites in front of the enemy with the command to contendite vestra sponte (attack), presumably with their javelins, to cause confusion and panic in the solid blocks of phalanxes. [44] Roman sources reflect on the prejudices of their times, but nevertheless testify to the Gauls' fierceness and bravery. They therefore clearly require space and flexibility between each other, so that each soldier must have three feet from the men to their flank and rear, if they are to be effective.
Early progress was spectacular as the initial Roman dispositions were driven back. Nevertheless, the distinct pattern of Roman tenacity holds. Some writers such as Luttwak condemn the old-style "forward" policy as indicating a "Maginot Line" mentality in the troubled latter centuries of the Empire. Prestige varied based on the cohort they supervised. Usually, these forts were in or near cities and villages. Many ancient armies used gaps of some sort, even the Carthaginians, who typically withdrew their initial skirmishing troops between the spaces before the main event. The battles below (see individual articles for detailed accounts) illustrate the difficulties of fighting against phalanx forces. Attack resource locations: Once they conquered territory, the Romans would secure as many resources as they could handle. [25], A general three-line deployment was to remain over the centuries, although the Marian reforms phased out most divisions based on age and class, standardized weapons, and reorganized the legions into larger manoeuvre units like cohorts. The deep three-line deployment of the Romans allowed combat pressure to be steadily applied forward. [12], Other training exercises taught the legionary to obey commands and assume battle formations. During the maelstrom of battle, it is also possible that as the units merged into line, the general checkerboard spacing became more compressed or even disappeared, and the fighting would see a more or less solid line engaged with the enemy. Instead of vast formations of thousands of troops, smaller units would engage smaller-scale incursions by raiders. Fighters travelled in groups of eight, and each octet was sometimes assigned a mule. Caesar's troops were discomfited by one such attack, and he met it by withdrawing into his fortified redoubt. Some ancient sources such as Polybius seem to imply that the legions could fight with gaps in their lines. The Romans were more persistent and more willing to absorb and replace losses over time than their opponents. The systematic wastage and destruction of enemy economic and human resources were called vastatio by the Romans. [87] Two of the major factors that have occupied scholars of the military will be discussed here: barbarization and the adaptation of a "mobile reserve" strategy.
His field pack included a shovel, a dolabra or pickaxe, and a wicker basket for hauling dirt. Once the machinery was in motion, however, the Roman infantry typically was deployed as the main body, facing the enemy. Following this barrage, the Roman infantry advanced, in four lines, until they came within 30 meters of the enemy, then they halted, hurled their pila and charged. Internal Roman fighting between Caesar and Pompey also saw the frequent employment of trenches, counter-trenches, dug-in strong points, and other works as the contenders manoeuvred against each other in field combat. The operations of the Roman commander Publius Ventidius Bassus illustrate three general tactics used by the infantry to fight their mounted foes. It is unknown how the soldiers opened the maniple, but it was probably by ordering one soldier in every second line to take a step forward.
Sometimes Roman soldiers would have mules that carried equipment. The Gallic were unable to sustain their strategy, however, and Vercingetorix was to become trapped in Alesia, facing not divided sections or detachments of the Roman Army but Caesar's full force of approximately 70,000 men (50,000 legionaries plus numerous additional auxiliary cavalry and infantry). Nevertheless, the Macedonian phalanx had key weaknesses. A rout looked possible. The Velites purpose on the battlefield was using javelins to disrupt the enemy formation and to inflict some preliminary casualties. Some historians note however that Rome often balanced brutal attrition with shrewd diplomacy, as demonstrated by Caesar's harsh treatment of Gallic tribes that opposed him, but his sometimes conciliatory handling of those that submitted. This consisted of ten stone-throwing onagers and twenty bolt-shooting ballistas; in addition, each of the legion's centuries had its own scorpio bolt thrower (sixty total), together with supporting wagons to carry ammunition and spare parts. Packed into a dense armoured mass, and equipped with massive pikes 12 to 21 feet (6.4m) in length, the phalanx was a formidable force.
The earliest soldiers of the Roman army were hoplites. Roman horsemen, while fast, were actually much too weak to cope with the very cavalry based invasions of the Huns, Goths, Vandals and Sassanids. [36], Another unique feature of the Roman infantry was the depth of its spacing. The fierceness of the Gallic and Germanic charges is often commented upon by some writers, and in certain circumstances, they could overwhelm Roman lines. The Roman "grind down" approach is also seen in the Bar Kokhba Jewish revolt against the Romans. After Attila's invasion of the Western Roman Empire, the Romans started to use mounted archers.[8]. The Roman polity's structuring, however, produced a steady supply of men willing and able to lead troops in battle men who were held accountable for defeat or malfeasance. also see the pullback as a strategic mistake, arguing that it left lower quality "second string" limitanei forces to stop an enemy until the distant mobile reserve arrived. The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest contains all four: numerical superiority, surprise, quick charges to close rapidly, and favorable terrain and environmental conditions (thick forest and pounding rainstorms) that hindered Roman movement and gave the warriors enough cover to conceal their movements and mount successive attacks against the Roman line. Combined arms and quick advance in later eras. Gabriel, Richard A.; Metz, Karen S. (1991). Rome's overall record against the Parthians was favourable, although the Parthian horsemen offered stiff resistance, as it was against the horsemen of Hannibal, and some Gallic opponents. After a long battle, the Persians withdrew a tactical victory (albeit a costly one for the Romans according to some historians). Chariot forces also attacked the legions as they were disembarking from ships during Caesar's invasion of Britain, but the Roman commander drove off the fast-moving assailants using covering fire (slings, arrows and engines of war) from his ships and reinforcing his shore party of infantry to charge and drive off the attack. 'Later Roman Battle Tactics' in C. Koepfer, F.W.
[85] In an earlier engagement outside the walls of Ctesiphon, Marcellinus again notes the value of the quick advance by the infantry: Mixed results against major cavalry enemies. Tacitus in his Annals reports that the Roman commander Germanicus recognized that continued operations in Gaul would require long trains of men and material to come overland, where they would be subject to attack as they traversed the forests and swamps. Ultimately, the latter was to prove decisive in Rome's long fought conquest of Gaul. A number of practical demonstrations might also be undertaken to test enemy reaction as well as to build troop morale. a mill for grinding grain, a small clay oven for baking bread, cooking pots, spare weapons, waterskins, and tents. Rome also used a variety of incentives to encourage cooperation by the elites of conquered peoples, co-opting opposition and incorporating them into the structure of the empire. Some historians show that they sometimes used massed fighting in tightly packed phalanx-type formations with overlapping shields, and employed shield coverage during sieges.
Effective leadership was also bound up with the famous Roman centurions, the backbone of the organization. The Comitatenses were grouped into field armies. It often took some time for the final array of the host, but when accomplished the army's grouping of legions represented a formidable fighting force, typically arranged in three lines with a frontage as long as one mile (about 1.5km). It is true that at Chlons, the Roman infantry contributed to the victory by seizing part of the battlefield's high ground. Should they be discomfited, there still remained the veterans of the triarii who let the survivors retreat through the preset gaps. And it was these Germanic tribes in part (most having some familiarity with Rome and its culture, and becoming more Romanized themselves) that were to eventually bring about the Roman military's final demise in the West. Sometimes these tactics were also used to conduct punitive raids on barbarian tribes which had performed raids across the border. Use of war machines and covering fire: Many Roman battles, especially during the late empire, were fought with the preparatory fire from catapults, ballistas and onagers. According to Plutarch, the Roman general was shown the sword in the temple at Gergovia some years after the battle, but he refused to reclaim it, saying that it was consecrated, and to leave it where it was.[65]. The initial phase of the clash had passed however and a slogging match ensued. [15] Fighting strength could vary, but generally a legion was made up of 4,800 soldiers, 60 centurions, 300 artillerymen, and 100 engineers and artificers, and 1,200 non-combatants. Such decline, of course, is closely linked with the decay of other facets of Rome's economy, society and political scene. Then the maniples fell back through the gaps in the principes, who followed the same procedure to form a battle line and charge. As combat lengthened and the battlefield compressed, the phalanx might thus become exhausted or rendered immobile, while the Romans still had enough left to not only manoeuvre but to make the final surges forward. In addition, it is claimed, the "forward" policy was not at all a static "Maginot" approach, but that traditional heavy legions and supporting cavalry could still move to a trouble spot by redeploying them from fortifications elsewhere along a particular frontier. [15] At the end of training the legionary had to swear an oath of loyalty to the SPQR (Senatus Populusque Romanus, the senate and the Roman people) or later to the emperor. "The country was wasted by fire and sword fifty miles round, nor sex nor age found mercy; places sacred and profane had the equal lot of destruction, all razed to the ground" (Tacitus, Annals.) An even more dramatic demonstration of Roman vulnerability is shown in the numerous wars against Parthian heavy cavalry. Against these mighty resources, Hannibal led from Spain an army of approximately 50,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry Rome's manpower reserves allowed it to absorb staggering losses, yet still continue to field large armies. The first structured unit line was made up of Hastati, the second Princeps, and the third Triarii. [62] When implemented consistently, this strategy saw some success against Roman operations. [100] As such it was a strong force for cohesion among Rome's infantrymen. [90] Other writers argue that while some ancient Romans did view the world in terms of barbarians versus civilized Romans (epitomized in Hadrian's Wall of separation), the reality of Roman frontiers was a fuzzy set of interlocking zones political, military, judicial and financial, rather than a neat linear boundary. Vegetius talked about Roman soldiers having three feet between them. Opponents could be relentlessly weakened and exhausted over the long run. The near-defeat of Caesar in his Gallic campaign confirms this latter pattern but also shows the strengths of Roman tactical organization and discipline.
Indeed, the Macedonian commander, Perseus, seeing the situation deteriorating, seems to have fled without even bringing his cavalry into the engagement. Note should be taken here of a large number of junior officers the Romans typically used to assure coordination and guidance. [80] The adjustments of Ventidius were as follows:[80]. Roman leadership was mixed, but over time it was often effective in securing Roman military success. The next line could then attack the enemy. After a regimented breakfast at the allocated time, trumpets were sounded and the camp's tents and huts were dismantled and preparations made for departure. The first cohort in a legion was usually the strongest, with the fullest personnel complement and with the most skilled, experienced men. In the early imperial period, however, Germanic warbands inflicted one of Rome's greatest military defeats, (the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest) which saw the destruction of three imperial legions and was to place a limit on Roman expansion in the West. These war machines, a form of ancient artillery, fired arrows and large stones towards the enemy (although many historians question the battlefield effectiveness of such weapons). Caesar was to mount these in boats on some operations in Britain, striking fear in the heart of the native opponents according to his writings. The Parthians also conducted a "scorched earth" policy against the Romans, refusing major set-piece encounters, while luring them deeper on to the unfavorable ground, where they would lack water supplies and a secure line of retreat. When the enemy closed, the hastati would charge. According to Polybius, in his comparison of the phalanx versus the Roman system: The Greek king Pyrrhus' phalangical system was to prove a tough trial for the Romans. Local peasants or farmers might have their supplies taken from them in order to supply the Roman legion. [47], Some writers suggest that as a result of such debacles, the expanding Roman power began to adjust to this vigorous, fast-moving new enemy. The circular hoplite shield was also enlarged and eventually replaced with the rectangular scutum for better protection. After staying in the camp for some time, the army would destroy the camp to prevent its use by the enemy, and then continue moving. [92], Disadvantages of the mobile reserve strategy versus the "forward" policy, Ancient writers like Zosimus in the 5th century AD condemned the "reserve" policy as a major weakening of the military force. Csar: a history of the art of war among the Romans Down to the End of the Roman Empire. Centurions commanded the centuries (groups of about 100 soldiers).
The third phase included the opening of the city's main gate by the cohorts which had managed to break through or scale the walls, provided the rams had not knocked the gate open.
Generally positioned in front of the main infantrymen were skirmishers called Velites. According to some writers, the triarii formed a continuous line when they deployed, and their forward movement allowed scattered or discomfited units to rest and reform, to later rejoin the struggle.[28]. Such early reforms also aided the Romans in their conquest of the rest of Italy over such foes as the Samnites, Latins and Greeks. With their customary discipline and cohesion, the Romans then began to drive back the barbarian assault. Prefect third in command of the legion. Legionaries carried onagers, ballistae, and scorpios. As German scholar Hans Delbruck notes in his "History of the Art of War": The Gallic also demonstrated a high level of tactical prowess in some areas. Weaknesses of the Macedonian phalanx. A network of camps and forts were included in these works. The difference between auxiliaries and legionaries began to become negligible from an equipment point of view. However, they were no longer used in an offensive role but primarily for the pre-battle show riding back and forth and hurling insults. Construction of fortified camps. In this battle the Macedonian phalanx originally held the high ground but all of its units had not been properly positioned due to earlier skirmishing. Some key phases of this evolution throughout Rome's military history include:[2]. Roman casualties were approximately 20,000 killed and 10,000 captured making the battle one of the costliest defeats in Roman history. While the drop in quality did not happen immediately, it is argued that over time, the limitanei declined into lightly armed, static watchman type troops that were of dubious value against increasing barbarian marauders on the frontiers. [26], As the army approached its enemy, the velites in front threw their javelins at the enemy and then retreat through the gaps in the lines. As with any military organization, training soldiers/armies requires a number of things and could prove to be quite costly in the long run. given growing difficulties with governing the vast empire, where political turmoil and severe financial difficulties had made the old preclusive security system untenable. The pullback of the best infantry was based more on political reasons (shoring up the power bases of the emperors and various elites) rather than on military reality. Occasionally, villages and towns would grow around these forts in order to suit the needs of the Limitanei. The Emperor would have his own personal Comitatenses army to help fight rebellions.
The stamina and willpower demanded to make yet one more charge, to make yet one more surge, grew even greater. Caesar himself rallied sections of his endangered army, impressing resolve upon the troops. In the Brittany region of France, moles and breakwaters were constructed at enormous effort to assault the estuarine strongholds of the Gauls. If well-led and deployed (compare Pyrrhus to the fleeing Perseus at Pydna below), they presented a credible infantry alternative to the heavy legion. Any history of the Roman infantry must grapple with the factors that led to the decline of the heavy legions that once dominated the Western world. Some soldiers also carried a type of turf cutter. This does not mean that heavy units disappeared entirely, but that their mass recruitment, formation, organization and deployment as the dominant part of the Roman military was greatly reduced. Each cohort was divided into three maniples. Field army: a grouping of several legions and auxiliary cohorts. The weapons changes described above are but one example. The discipline of the Roman infantry restored the line, however, and a counterattack eventually defeated the Gallic forces and their allies. [12] Standards varied over time, but normally recruits were first required to complete 20 Roman miles (29.62km or 18.405 modern miles) with 20.5kg in five summer hours (the Roman day was divided into 12 hours regardless of season, as was the night), which was known as "the regular step" or "military pace". [18] No other ancient army persisted over such a long period in systematic camp construction like the Romans, even if the army rested for only a single day. The opposition also failed to deploy supporting forces effectively to help the phalanx at its time of dire need. The original Roman army was made up of hoplites, whose main strategy was forming into a phalanx. Roman soldiers would train for four months. One historian of the Second Punic War states: According to Polybius (2.24), the total number of Roman and allied men capable of bearing arms in 225BC exceeded 700,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalries. Deployed too late, they might be swept away in a rout if the first line began to break. Others behind them would be stepping up into the fray meanwhile, engaging new foes or covering their colleagues. Another is a particular attack formation, such as the wedge discussed above, or an encirclement as at the Battle of Ilipa. [48] The Romans began to phase out the monolithic phalanx they formerly fought in and adopted the more flexible manipular formation. The Roman Legionary Cohorts continued to use the testudo throughout the remainder of their history until the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. The campaigns of Hannibal illustrate this well, as Numidian and Spanish/Gallic horsemen repeatedly outflanked Roman formations, dealing devastating blows in the sides and rear. This caused the enemy phalanx to collapse, securing a route for the Romans. These Roman techniques repeatedly defeated their Germanic adversaries. Emphasis was on using the shield to provide maximum body coverage, and for pushing enemies, while attacking with their gladius in thrusts and short cuts in clinch, minimizing exposure to the enemy. The inner trench alone was 20 feet (6.1m) deep, and Caesar diverted a river to fill it with water. It had proven itself on the battlefields of Mediterranean Europe, from Sparta to Macedonia, and had met and overcome several strong non-European armies from Persia to Pakistan/Northwest India. Modern scholars such as Michael J Taylor state that the gaps between the maniples were 1020 meters. [20], Intelligence. Compressed in the heat of battle, its troops could only primarily fight facing forward. This was the formation overcome by the Romans at the Battle of Cynoscephalae. [97], Roman discipline, organization and logistical systemization sustained combat effectiveness over a longer period. Generally speaking, the Gauls and Germans needed to get into good initial position against the Romans and to overwhelm them in the early phases of the battle. The operations of Scipio were an improvement on some of those who had previously faced Hannibal, showing a higher level of advance thinking, preparation and organization. The Romans understood this concept very well and realized that training soldiers could include paying for his rations [food], his salary, his armour, his armaments [weapons], and a soldier's honorarium [which was paid to those who received honourable discharges]. [19], Breaking camp and marching. Himmler and J. Lffl (eds), This page was last edited on 29 June 2022, at 15:28. It had some manoeuvrability, but once a clash was joined this decreased, particularly on rough ground. A charge by the Nervi tribe through a gap between the legions however almost turned the tide again, as the onrushing warriors seized the Roman camp and tried to outflank the other army units engaged with the rest of the tribal host. [51], Most significant Gallic and Germanic victories show two or more of these characteristics. The tribes of Europe did not have a state or economic structure able to support lengthy campaigns and therefore could often (but not always) be made to change their minds about opposing Roman hegemony. The diverted Gallic forces returned however and in frantic fighting outside the town walls, the Romans lost 700 men, including 46 centurions.
