[fn]Neither attack caused civilian casualties. It is thus incumbent for the next administration to comprehend the roots of rebellion and provide real answers to questions surrounding real poverty. 0000006092 00000 n Sinas recalls order profiling Muslim students in metro Manila, Rappler, 21 February 2020.Hide Footnote Some Lanao residents also felt that the states programming unfairly singled out displaced Maranaos from Marawi as potential militants who would harbour an element of mistrust in the state. vs. Executive Secretary et al., 17 May 2021.Hide Footnote Human rights groups lodged a round of appeals following this decision, though the chances that the court will revise the law further seem slim. Further military pressure forced the militants to move around repeatedly in remote parts of Cotabato province. Well aware of the threat jihadist groups pose to peace in the Bangsamoro, the Philippine government has tried to complement security operations with non-military initiatives. With the national political scene and many institutions stacked with his supporters, any attempt to drag him to court would likely face considerable opposition. [fn]The MILF has a body tasked with speaking to members of militant groups but in the absence of formal ties to government agencies, its capacity to develop policies or mechanisms beyond mere dialogue is limited.Hide Footnote At this juncture, isolating militants might make them even more determined insurgents. Malaysian officials have regularly alerted Manila that Abu Sayyaf members are hiding in Sabah. Most of the Abu Sayyaf fighters are under the command of either Mundi Sawadjaan, the nephew of the former ISIS-designated emir Hajan Sawadjaan, or Radullan Sahiron, who defected from the old Moro rebels to Abu Sayyaf in 1992.

While, as noted above, Manilas withdrawal from the Rome Statute in 2019 does not end the courts legal jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed when the Philippines was an ICC party, it does complicate the courts capacity to undertake a meaningful investigation, let alone conduct a trial. Crisis Group online interview, source in Maguindanao, 8 August 2021. Reintegration programs in the Bangsamoro are full of potential, but so far remain largely ad hoc and overly security-oriented. Crisis Group online interview, source from Lanao, 18 August 2021. 0000002390 00000 n

cit.Hide Footnote. Crisis Group online interview, peace worker, 13 July 2021. The prime duty of reconstruction lies with Manila and its Bangon Marawi task force, which urgently needs to expedite the process in order to regain locals trust.[fn]Crisis Group online interview, Maranao civil society representative, 25 June 2021.Hide Footnote It should be transparent about the exact state of reconstruction efforts in proactive updates to Marawis displaced population, through public meetings but also channels such as social media and radio.

His group launched a first wave of attacks in Maguindanao in 2017 and attempted to raise the black ISIS flag at a town hall. are largely spared from the surrender ceremonies and the killings. In March 2022, jihadist media released an image of people in the Bangsamoro pledging allegiance to the new ISIS leader, Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Quraishi. The group is known to have used child combatants in the past. The judges also authorised the prosecutor to look into similar crimes committed between 2011 and 2016 in and around Davao, where Duterte served as mayor and vice mayor for two decades before becoming president. cit. Several sources suspect the moves were politically motivated, part of attempts by powerful Maguindanao figures to discredit the BARMM by using the BIFF. Edwin Fernandez, Army retakes Maguindanao town after 6-HR BIFF occupation, Inquirer, 9 May 2021. Part of the reason for its resilience lies in abiding governance problems across the archipelago that successive authorities have failed to address. See Lian Buan, Appeals roll for another shot to void feared anti-terror law, Rappler, 2 March 2022.. Crisis Group online interview, mil- itary officer, 21 June 2021. Reports have emerged that both Karialan and Abu Jihad were killed at around the same time. Central Mindanao: The BIFF and Its Offshoots. Duterte has simultaneously sanctionedthe killing of suspects who do not participate in these processes, with the violencecarried out by police and vigilante groupscomprising active and retired officers, former communist guerrillas, and even guns-for-hire. [fn]Julmunir Jannaral, Adapting to bureaucracy a big challenge for BTA, Manila Times, 11 August 2019.Hide Footnote, While some new housing has gone up, the town is nowhere close to returning to normal.[fn]Activists said the government has rebuilt only 30 per cent of the hardest-hit areas, not more than 60 per cent, as officials claim. cit., p. 4. See also Catherine Gonzales, Govt troops launch air strike against Daulah Islamiyah in Lanao del Sur, Inquirer, 1 March 2022.Hide Footnote Militants often nurse an antipathy or even a hatred for the military, including a desire for revenge. For now, the Philippines case appears to be yet another example of the limits of the international justice system in countries whose governments refuse to collaborate with the ICC. Luke Lischin, Surviving or Thriving? Further adjustments to military and police operations, which, while necessary, often lead to large-scale displacement of civilians because units have used excessive force in populated areas. COVID-19 and Violent Non-state Actors in the Southern Philippines, New Mandala, 9 September 2020. Sadly, though, not all laws are the same. See Rapid Midterm Review of the Bangsamoro Transition Period, Mindanao Peoples Caucus, October 2020, p. 54.Hide Footnote. [fn]Karialan is a cousin of the MILFs influential 118th Base commander, Abdulwahid Tundok.Hide Footnote Some of his followers, many of whom are relatives, come from other places in Maguindanao and Cotabato provinces, including the towns of Midsayap, GSK Pendatun and Datu Paglas. While his party remaining in power would ensure the future governments continued non-cooperation with the court, as vice president, he would also likely enjoy immunity from national prosecution as well (though Filipino legal experts are divided on that issue). In a major setback to the president, the Philippines Supreme Court has refuted the governments argument regarding the ICCs alleged lack of jurisdiction. The MILF, however, has found it challenging to engage Abu Sayyaf, as the group does not have a command structure. Militant violence is declining but has not disappeared in the newly created Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in the southern Philippines. Neil Arwin Mercado, Marawi compensation bill awaits Duterte signature. Although the armed groups cannot hold territory due to intensified military operations, kinship ties often provide their members with safe havens. [fn]The interim government should also not neglect the island provinces, in particular Sulu, while planning infrastructure and other development projects.[fn]See Crisis Group Report, Southern Philippines: Fostering an Inclusive Bangsamoro, op. Abu Sayyaf sub-leaders wife arrested with bomb components AFP, GMA News, 6 March 2022. Several human rights groups have challenged this act in the Philippine Supreme Court, mostly on the grounds that it defines terrorism so vaguely that the state could abuse it to outlaw legitimate forms of dissent. Salafi-jihadism combines a belief in a pure Islam (as practiced by the first Muslims, whom Salafis call the pious ancestors or. 0000000016 00000 n Esmael Abdulmalik, or Abu Toraife, the former vice chair for internal affairs of the original BIFF, is the leader of the most hardline splinter, known as Jamaatul al-Muhajireen wal Ansar or Daulah Islamiyah-Toraife.[fn]Abu Toraife broke with the Bungos-led BIFF faction, perhaps due to differences over his allegiance to ISIS and perhaps for other reasons. startxref While it dismissed petitions that aimed to nullify the withdrawal, the court was adamant that the government shall not be discharged from any criminal proceedings. c`b``3 1x4>Fc` K Piracy is still a concern for regional governments, however. In some cases, individuals had attended a surrender ceremony,yet were still killed. The views expressed here represent those of the contributors and not IPI. Crisis Group online interviews, military officer, 21 June 2021; source close to a family with Abu Sayyaf links, 20 April 2020. These killings were often perpetrated in broad daylight and the victims were mostly petty criminals, gang members, and street children. [2] His unrelenting and brash approach towards social and economic problems within the country has garnered heavy support within the Philippines, leading him to win a landslide majority within the Senate as President, which makes his proposed policies much easier to be rolled out. These efforts have made it difficult for militants to regain momentum. For most of the documentary, we follow the Special Operations Unit led by Modequillo, whose job is to curb the mounting wave of violence in Caloocan. Allen Estabillo, Cop slain, 2 others hurt in SoCot ambush, Philippine News Agency, 5 March 2021; 2 suspected Dawlah Islamiya members killed in South Cotabato op AFP, GMA News, 8 June 2021. 0000004876 00000 n Crisis Group telephone interview, government official, 23 February 2021.Hide Footnote The centre of gravity in the conflict between Abu Sayyaf remnants and government forces lies in the western part of Jolo island, a dense jungle between a mountain range and the sea. At first, he refuses to make any connection. [fn]Crisis Group online interview, 11 August 2021.Hide Footnote, Despite the petitions questioning the bills legality, the Supreme Court upheld most of the law, removing only two provisions. The ICC investigation thus faces an uphill struggle. 0000012280 00000 n With his government presently taking flak for its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the opposition may well use the criminal investigation to further discredit him. [fn]In some places, civilian officials have designated militants as personae non grata.Hide Footnote For many young Bangsamoro bureaucrats, the military has even become a partner, although there is a process of adjustment given widespread resentment of the army following decades of conflict. In some instances, women and girls supported militants during the Marawi war. Crisis Group online interview, security analyst, 15 June 2021. In his sermons, he often says his group represents the remaining true practitioners of the Moro struggle in Mindanao.[fn]Bungos says he is the BIFFs legitimate leader, claiming that Kato anointed him as his successor on his deathbed.Hide Footnote Bungos men operate inside the SPMS Box, as well as in the surrounding mountains and other parts of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat. While they have clearly reached an unprecedented scale under Dutertes watch, extrajudicial killings are not a new phenomenon in the Philippines, where many provinces have a long history of police vigilantism. In the Lanao region, remnants of the Maute Group, who made up the bulk of the jihadist forces during the Marawi battle, are much weakened but still appear to be recruiting. Statement posted to Facebook, 29 January 2020.Hide Footnote Karialans spokesperson, Abu Jihad, said: We are living quietly in our area. The MILF, however, has found it challenging to engage Abu Sayyaf, as the group does not have a command structure. Crisis Group online interview, security analyst, 7 May 2021. Still, in the right conditions, they could regain momentum and throw the transition off track. But the fact that there is no second Marawi siege in the making is not a success in itself; militants do not need to be ISIS-inspired to continue fighting the Philippine state. 18, 20-21.Hide Footnote The interim government and local authorities throughout the Bangsamoro need to cooperate more closely to complete development projects such as village halls and health facilities, rehabilitate villages damaged by protracted violence and increase infrastructure support to far-flung towns. COVID-19 and Violent Non-state Actors in the Southern Philippines, New Mandala, 9 September 2020. In the past, Abu Sayyaf and other commanders used intermarriages to secure communal acceptance, if not outright support.[fn]Crisis Group interview, source close to an Abu Sayyaf commander, 22 December 2019.Hide Footnote At present, recruitment often follows familial lines and, in some cases, slain militants relatives have taken up arms themselves.[fn]Crisis Group interview, source from Lanao del Sur, 3 March 2022.Hide Footnote Secondly, local politicians, more often than not, are aware of militants operating in their towns but let them be, as long as they do not cause [them] trouble.[fn]Crisis Group online interview, source from Lanao, 18 August 2021.Hide Footnote Some politicians may even be in cahoots with militants. Crisis Group online interview, 16 June 2021. If so, our state has failed its citizens in two ways: by divesting underprivileged bodies of their worth and by normalizing violence to the point that our basic humanity has been compromised. But although accounts of Dutertes direct involvement exist, clear and concrete evidence has been elusive. The case Jones and Sarbil seem to be making is this: in Duterte's Philippines, violence has become banal and perfunctory. [fn]Only Mundi Sawadjaan, Radullan Sahiron, Radzmil Jannatul and a few other subleaders remain.Hide Footnote While the group is notorious for kidnapping and piracy, two tactics that have historically set it apart from other Bangsamoro outfits, its activity on both these fronts has also declined. These armed groups, some of which have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), remain outside the peace process between the national government and the MILF, which culminated in creation of the BARMM in early 2019. The pandemic exacerbated economic troubles in the BARMM, though the economy grew overall and the overall poverty incidence declined. Over the last few years, the Philippine government and private individuals have filed cases against members of militant groups such as the BIFF, Abu Sayyaf and the coalition that attacked Marawi.

Karialan has not pledged allegiance to ISIS and has reiterated that his faction is separate from the jihadists. See also Acram Latiph, Examining Local Grievances and Militant Groups in the Southern Philippines, U.S. Institute of Peace, 1 February 2022.Hide Footnote Nonetheless, evidence suggests that many recruits are still under eighteen years old. But does it really have an impact?[fn]Crisis Group online interview, official, 15 July 2021.Hide Footnote Another observer said many NGOs seek funding for these projects because they are popular with donors, but not all activities make sense or are appropriate.[fn]Crisis Group online interview, source from Lanao region, 20 July 2021.Hide Footnote Programs that aim to engage militants and their families and supporters are rare, on the other hand, on account of staff security concerns but also because NGOs are nervous that the state could come after them citing the 2020 anti-terror law. Fonbuena, The First Year of the Anti-Terrorism Act, op. These aren't isolated incidents or glitches in the system, but necessary and intended casualties of the government's campaign against the poor. Frustration with the slow pace of the peace process was the main factor leading the Moro rebels to splinter in the first place.

As for the Bangsamoro government, it first worked to start dialogue with militant groups, and later opted for a more governance-oriented approach, supporting programs to disarm militants and designing development plans for conflict hotspots in the region.

The Department of Interior and Local Government drafted a national action plan based on these concepts. [fn]Through an Australian grant, the UN Development Programme provided support in crafting the plan.Hide Footnote The document lays out root causes of militancy, ranging from poverty to repeated displacement, and organises government agencies into clusters to tackle them. The Philippines National Police Chief has admitted there is not enough evidence for most of the suspects called out by Duterte, and there have been many reported cases of identified names belonging to dead or even non-existent people. A second bullet escapes. Crisis Group online interview, Sulu-based source, 15 October 2021.Hide Footnote, Finally, as Abu Sayyaf has always been a network of cells rather than a consolidated force, remnants of its structure inactive fighters and their kin could reappear.[fn]Georgi Engelbrecht, Violence in southern Philippines highlights resiliency of militant networks, The Strategist (blog), 17 September 2020.Hide Footnote A long-time observer of Sulu said: Abu Sayyaf has been just melting back into the civilian population. Only a handful of high-profile cases have led to the conviction of police officers. A Review of Post-Marawi Crisis Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, 2017-2020, INCITEGov/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, October 2021.Hide Footnote Well aware of rising popular frustration with the delays, the interim government put reconstruction of Marawi on its twelve-point priority agenda for the Bangsamoro transition, but the central government Task Forces mandate means it can play only a supporting role. [fn]Lead Inspector General for Operation Pacific Eagle, Report to the U.S. Congress, October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019, U.S. Department of Defense, p. 14. In 2022, the mayors post in at least three towns will be contested, and the campaigns could be tumultuous if candidates likewise decide to rely upon force of arms. The program has demobilised around 290 Abu Sayyaf fighters so far, significantly eroding the networks capacity in the island province. endstream endobj 762 0 obj <>/Metadata 100 0 R/PageLabels 93 0 R/Pages 95 0 R/StructTreeRoot 102 0 R/Type/Catalog/ViewerPreferences<>>> endobj 763 0 obj <>/Font<>/ProcSet[/PDF/Text]/XObject<>>>/Rotate 0/StructParents 0/TrimBox[8.50394 8.50394 439.37 657.638]/Type/Page>> endobj 764 0 obj <> endobj 765 0 obj <> endobj 766 0 obj <> endobj 767 0 obj <> endobj 768 0 obj <> endobj 769 0 obj <> endobj 770 0 obj <> endobj 771 0 obj <>stream hbb Marawi, Mindanao, Philippines, March 2019. Crisis Group online interview, source close to fighters family, 8 August 2021. Crisis Group online interview, military official, 29 June 2021. Jairo Bolledo, Army kills Daulah Islamiyah leader in Mindanao AFP, Rappler, 29 October 2021. [fn]Crisis Group telephone interviews, civil society leader from Lanao del Sur, 25 February 2021; source from Lanao, 21 June 2021Hide Footnote Recruiters increasingly look for new fighters among clan networks (as opposed to people who were friends and acquaintances before the Marawi siege) and among women (who are harder to track than young men, whom authorities are watching). They [the government] are fooling the people, said one. Likewise, the interim government should develop programs for orphans, for example through setting up orphanages, scholarships and other financial support for children bereft of parents due to past conflicts in the BARMM. Crisis Group online interview, security analyst, 22 February 2021. The MILF has described Abu Toraife as difficult to influence. Crisis Group interviews, clan leaders and civil society representatives, Marawi City, December 2019. For instance, it characterises the struggle in Mindanao as jihad fard ayn, ie, a personal obligation of every Muslim to defend the homeland from invaders.Hide Footnote As it considers the army an outside aggressor, the group describes its mission as defensive. The Bill of Rights is placed right at the center of the Constitution because it is for reasons of equilibrium that the relationship between the government and the governed has been set. Better delivery of public services and development outreach in places marred by conflict, for example the hinterlands of Maguindanao province known as the SPMS Box and remote areas of Lanao del Sur province. With its largely Tausug population living on numerous small islands, Sulu has long been a battleground between Moro rebels and the military.[fn]Sulu is also dominated by the Moro National Liberation Front, which has been formally at peace with the Philippine government since 1996. Nos. In his own words, Duterte promoted Dela Rosa to head the police to look for the enemies and destroy the [drug] apparatus. Official militias in the Philippines fall into two broad categories: Civilian Voluntary Organisations under the command of local police, and by extension the mayor, or the aforementioned peacekeepers organised at the village level under the village heads command. Crisis Group online interview, source from Maguindanao, 31 July 2021. Crisis Group interview, senior military officer, Manila, 17 September 2020.Hide Footnote In addition, the military has striven to win hearts and minds by pushing local authorities to improve service delivery and publicly distance themselves from militant groups. Anong gagawin natin diyan sa 18,000 [drug watch] surrenderees? Police Chief Jemar Modequillo asks a crowd during a community assembly. 0000008167 00000 n 0000010218 00000 n Crisis Group online interview, mil- itary officer, 21 June 2021. Helping women and their kin with employment that is feasible and socially acceptable would likely help them shift away from militancy. Police operations to arrest Abu Sayyaf members could be useful in the Sulu archipelago and Zamboanga Peninsula, where many militants are on the run. A Review of Post-Marawi Crisis Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, 2017-2020, INCITEGov/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, October 2021. The court may count on victims groups, civil society organisations and legal experts within the country to support the investigation, including through digital means or meetings abroad. Among his most controversial statements were his promises to kill every drug dealer and user and to dump so many dead bodies in Manila Bay that fish there would grow fat. [fn]Examining Endemic Drivers of Radicalization and Violent Extremism, webinar, Mindanao State University, 15 July 2021. Closer coordination of the various disengagement programs for militants that exist in BARMM provinces, with extra funding for such initiatives, when required, and cooperation with local authorities. On 26 January 2022, for example, Abu Sayyaf commander Ellam Nasirin ambushed the military in Tugas village in Patikul town to get revenge for the death of his relatives. Crisis Group online interview, 27 January 2022. Although the total number of fighters remains small apparently no more than a few hundred each of these outfits poses a challenge to peace in the Bangsamoro. Following a three-year preliminary examination of the alleged crimes, the prosecutor sought permission in June to proceed with a more formal investigation, arguing that Dutertes anti-drug campaign cannot be seen as a legitimate law enforcement operation, adding that the killings can be viewed neither as legitimate nor as mere excesses in an otherwise legitimate operation.

Ferdinandh Cabrera, Armed clash in Datu Paglas averted by talk between mayor and BIFF leader, Mindanews, 8 May 2021.

Theyll never take me alive, Duterte himself vowed in early August when asked about the possibility of being brought before the ICC.What exactly is President Duterte suspected of? Crisis Group online interview, military officer, 21 June 2021. Later, he uses his bat to strike the open palms of his wards. A policeman says that drug users choose to live in hell. On 16 September, presidential legal counsel Salvador Panelo repeated that the government would not allow ICC investigators to enter the country. He also argued that the Rome Statute never took effect in the country, back in 2011, because it was never published in the official gazette. The army has not confirmed his death. Julie Alipala, Soldier killed, 2 others wounded in Abu Sayyaf attack in Sulu. Weve also witnessed how the Anti-Terrorism Law became the basis of Dutertes red-tagging campaign, no thanks to the NTF-ELCAC who put the law to good use. Speculations as to how this law will again be abused by the next administration more so if Ferdinand Bongbong Marcos wins run high. Philippine military identifies IS extremist groups new regional leader, Benar News, 2 March 2022.

[fn], Programs to demobilise militants are in place throughout the Bangsamoro. [fn]Crisis Group online interview, development worker, 16 June 2021.Hide Footnote Some returnees have been unable to reach the land they once cultivated due to security restrictions.[fn]Crisis Group online interview, Sulu-based source, 10 August 2021.Hide Footnote An official in a pilot village spoke of worries about returnees economic well-being due to lack of clarity in the program, coupled with the economic challenges brought by the pandemic.[fn]Crisis Group online interview, 16 June 2021. See Ana P. Santos, Women of the eastern caliphate, Rappler, 27 and 28 December 2019; and Criselda Yabes, Philippines must disarm the child warriors of Sulu. More broadly, it identified priority development projects under its moral governance agenda, to deliver the promised peace dividends. Crisis Group interview, senior military officer, Manila, 17 September 2020.

Then he clarifies: The police kill when [the suspected drug users] fight back. Inexplicably, a sudden fit of laughter overcomes him. To many observers, the speech was in keeping with the presidents often meandering and contradictory public statements. Militants, who are overwhelmingly from the Bangsamoro, tap local grievances to promote their agenda and take advantage of the nexus of politics, clan ties and the shadow economy to sustain themselves. The interim government is also striving to play a role in reintegrating militants. Gated communities in Manila, for example, can provide certification from homeowners associations that they are drug-free, which is enough to dissuade police officers from pursuingTokhangactivities.Rather than encouraging vigilante justice against them, Duterte has also granted personal audiences to drug trade figures of higher stature. The plans are not always well coordinated. (2018, January 20). In Sulu, locals are enlisting in paramilitary groups called Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units. [fn]John Unson, BARMM earmarks P100 million for community, peace-building programs, Philippine Star, 14 December 2019.Hide Footnote For 2021, it earmarked a budget for 250 fighters through cash aid, housing, livelihood packages and skills development. Papatayin ba natin 'yan? The groups main hideout appears to be in the mountains between Jolo and Patikul towns in Sulu. Crisis Group online interview, army officer, 20 August 2021. In March and April 2021, for example, clashes between security forces and BIFF militants drove out at least 30,000 villagers.[fn]Edwin Fernandez, Maguindanao clashes displace thousands, Inquirer, 8 April 2021.Hide Footnote In early March 2022, thousands of civilians again evacuated in anticipation of ground offensives following military deployment in and near the SPMS Box.[fn]See Facebook post by Magungaya Mindanao Incorporated, 8 March 2022.Hide Footnote The often repeated displacement of civilians, along with the destruction of property, puts a brake on economic progress and creates uncertainty for residents.[fn]Some of the villages in or near the SPMS Box are still in ruins months after the clashes.Hide Footnote A relief worker said: Civilians are always ready to evacuate.