For instance, in the early years after the revolution, the presence of CSOs at meetings between IOs and state institutions increased the likelihood that public actors would recognize the need to address immigration as a topic in Tunisian public life. 89% of participants in the study were not informed of the reason for their detention; 84% of them participated in hearings on their detention, but were unable to appeal against their expulsion order and detention; the appeals lodged by seven people were unsuccessful.
Under the regime of Ben Ali, all interactions with IOs or diplomatic partners were under tight state surveillance. The 2011 revolution and subsequent democratic transition have shifted the fundamentals of Tunisian political life. Registered office: c/o MDR, 88 Fleet Street, London EC4Y 1DH, UK.
According to the FTDES rights group, the Tunisian coast guard intercepted some 19,500 people attempting to cross the Mediterranean in the first nine months of this year.
!
"Ad-hocratic immigration governance: how states secure their power over immigration through intentional ambiguity.
The visa processing methodology allows wealthier people to escape the nets laid out by migration management. 
Personal usage as private individuals "fair dealing" is allowed.
Tunisia as a Revolutionized Space of Migration. Fast-track procedures presume that the situation in Tunisia means that people are not fleeing persecution, in a system that does not consider, for example, that sexual orientation (three participants claimed that they were persecuted for this reason) may lead to discrimination (in law and practice) in Tunisia.
This conflict has jeopardized cooperation with other actors institutional and societal which has obstructed reform processes such as elaborating an asylum law or politically validating the national migration strategy. In Tunisia, the first decade of democratization did not lead to an expansion of migrant rights. Mouvements 93:99-106.
2011. , () (CRM), .
[2] Cuttitta, Paolo.
"L'immigration subsaharienne en Tunisie: De la reconnaissance d'un fait social la cration d'un enjeu gestionnaire."
Many Tunisians were returned following either the issuing of expulsion orders or deferred refusal of entry, as happened to all of the studys 53 participants.
34% of participants claimed not have been provided interpretation and 55% claimed they did not understand the content of what they felt compelled to sign. 2019.
52% of participants claimed they did not have sufficient food on quarantine ships, 14% declared that they did not have a bed or chair, or a mattress and clean bed linen, and 96% complained about a lack of access to showers or hot water, although most received hygiene kits.
The length of stays in CPRs depends on how long it takes to organise a return.
"Le gouvernement des migrations en Tunisie : vers un nouveau paradigme?"
Tunisia is in the throes of economic and social crisis a decade after the fall of autocrat Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali to a popular uprising, which brought democracy to the North African country but also higher unemployment and inflation.
If identification proves impossible, people may be held in CPRs for a maximum of 90 days, extendable by a further 30 days if they come from a country with which Italy has a readmission agreement.
democratically legitimize policies played out differently for emigration and immigration.
externalization and securitization of migration.
Reception and detention conditions in hotspots, quarantine ships and CPRs.
"FRAN Quarterly, Issue 1, JanuaryMarch 2011."
Yet, despite newly gained freedoms and more transparent policy processes, Tunisia's securitized migration policies have remained largely unchanged in the first decade of democratization. ", Zemni, Sami.
This analysis is a summary of the author's article ".
Tunisian participants in the study were held in hotspots for an average of four days before undergoing quarantine, without any information provided to them or judicial scrutiny of their detention; two participants stayed in hotspots for 22 days. 2017.
Italian law allows asylum seekers to be held for identification.
Hence, most Tunisians end up in detention awaiting returns without being informed that they could apply for protection.
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In addition, the migration-terrorism nexus present in both Tunisian and European discourses has further reinforced security approaches on both sides of the Mediterranean.
The EU is discussing a similar deal with Libya.
The report then focuses on detention and reception conditions, including instances of personal or institutional violence, noting that Tunisians undergo painful experiences: from interception or rescues at sea by the Italian Coast Guard, to removal to Tunisia. Authorities, staff in centres and cultural mediators exercise a degree of discretional power to allow or reject access to demand asylum on the basis of applicants countries of origin, despite eligibility formally depending on personal circumstances leading to flight.
A lack of (or provision of incomplete) legal information that would enable the assertion of their rights is a barrier for Tunisians in Italy and 70% of participants did not duly receive information.
An information note (foglio notizie) is the first-level screening to impede Tunisian citizens access to asylum procedures based on where they come from.
Those immigration policy changes that have been implemented remained informal or limited to specific migrant groups.[5].
", 2018. Yet, while these laws were welcome by civil society actors and international observers, they only affected migrant rights at the fringe and left the core of Tunisia's immigration regime largely unchanged.
CPRs are deemed to lack an adequate legal framework, which means that they lack fundamental safeguards and enable wide discretional powers to be exercised by public authorities and detention centre management. Democratization thus led to more inclusive and transparent policy processes. " " - . After 2011, international funding and capacity building activities by IOs such as UNHCR or IOM have burgeoned; and their daily interactions with Tunisian institutions and CSOs multiplied. What explains the persistence of securitized approaches towards migration in Tunisias context of democratization? Second, more inclusive policymaking triggered contradictory dynamics within the Tunisian state, leading to more transparency and engagement but also to more inter-institutional conflict. claims for a more rights-based polity did ultimately not spill over into more rights for migrants.
[10] Given these contradictory demands, political leaders deliberately sidelined immigration from the political agenda. The third part of the report examines the logic behind the hotspot approach and migration policies in EU states, concluding that security prevails over reception and that their goal is to protect Europe from external enemies.
"Courir ou mourir. Migration Information Source.
[9] Simultaneously, democratization freed up previously repressed racist sentiments in the public sphere and enabled Tunisians who felt endangered by diversity to voice their fears.
The funds are meant to incentivize Tunis to keep its borders shut.
"The EU must work with partner countries to reduce irregular departures, manage migration and examine reasons that cause, particularly economic consequences of pandemic,"Johansson said in a tweet ahead of her trip. We also welcome links to material on our site.
2021.
More than 58,800 migrants have managed to reach Italy since the start of the year, most of them by sea, according to the U.N. refugee agency.
Tunisia as a Case Study.
Indeed, during demonstrations in January 2011, the rights to emigrate and to participate in the polity from abroad were core demands of the revolution.
Although external actors have successfully set the issue of immigration on the Tunisian governmental agenda, attempts to impose specific frames have also been met by open or subtle resistances from Tunisian state actors at the level of policy development and policy practice.
The multiplication of actors engaged on migration within the Tunisian state and the increased bureaucratic activism have thus made policymaking more incoherent and dependent on individual or institutional agendas. 2012.
untouched. According to the UN, at least 760 people have died trying to make the Mediterranean crossing between January 1 and May 31.
- , , ? Heinrich-Bll-Stiftung e.V.
, as Europe's political goal to reduce migration to its southern borders created pressures on Tunisia to simultaneously restrict the rights of Tunisian emigrants and expand the rights of immigrants in Tunisia. [2] Five years on, this problem persists.
"Les marges renaissantes : Amazigh, juif, Noir.
- , , ?
Ultimately, liberal migration reform seems to have failed for two reasons: because the security priorities of Tunisia's Interior Ministry and of European external actors have not been fundamentally affected by the democratic transition and, regarding immigration, because there is no clear majority within Tunisian society to politicize the issue through a human rights lens. 2011.
The Tunisian Forum of Economic and Social Rights said that the number of illegal Tunisian migrants reaching Italy in 2019 was 2,654 in 2019, and 5,200 in 2018.
The European Agenda on Migration instituted hotspots near entry points as a way to support member states experiencing disproportionate pressure at the EUs external borders and to improve reception practices, but they mainly function to swiftly identify, categorise and block people. It requires that dedicated areas be set up within hotspots, and that people be held for the shortest possible time (up to a maximum of 30 days) to verify their identity and nationality.
"Les marges renaissantes : Amazigh, juif, Noir.
, , , , -SIT . Limits to international protection derive from a lack of information and interviews to make their case, fast-track procedures, and from Tunisias classification as a safe country of origin.
", Natter, Katharina.
Registered UK charity number: 1154784.
An initial information slip becomes a binding record, often without the people concerned understanding the written text before signing it in a coercive context.
2020.
2020. Migrations Socit 177(3):3-18. 90% of Tunisians were held in Lampedusa and 10% in Trapani. 
On the other hand, it also increases Tunisia's political reticence towards externally imposed migration control agendas.
Under the deal,Tunisia would be offered economic assistance by Brussels in exchange for stopping migrant boats from leaving its shores.
Expanding on the United Nations Womens Rights Convention, Tunisia became the first Arab country to incorporate into its laws the notion of gender-based political violence. Three types of holding facilities are examined in the report: hotspots, quarantine ships and pre-deportation detention centres (CPRs). This has ultimately reinforced, democratization did not reduce external demands for migration control but instead gave rise to shifting coalitions between state, civil society and international actors on immigration or emigration. Third, democratization did not reduce external demands for migration control but instead gave rise to shifting coalitions between state, civil society and international actors on immigration or emigration.
The proposed Screening Regulation would entrench this practice across the EU. This report stresses that it focuses on the tip of the iceberg, the impact of security-minded migration policy on thousands of people forced into living illegally who are criminalised by policies and detention practices. In parallel, increased political freedoms prompted civil activism on an unprecedented scale.
It said the trend had accelerated since the establishment in June of a direct line of communication between Rome and Tunis to coordinate efforts against illegal immigration and share information. - 22 , : .
.
Tunisia's migration policy: the ambiguous consequences of democratization.
80% of participants claimed not to have received any document to explain their situation, the reasons for their predicament, its consequences (three or five-year re-entry bans) and the possibility of filing appeals. Created in 2011, the SEMTE was transferred in August 2016 from Social Affairs to Foreign Affairs in response to Parliamentarians representing Tunisians Residing Abroad, triggering open discontent from the Social Affairs Ministry.
On June 1, the EU announced that it had disburded 300 million in macro-financial assistance to Tunisia. This discriminatory procedure has driven EU migration policies for 20 years.
[6] Cassarino 2018 ; Geisser 2019 ; Meddeb, Hamza. Furthermore, UNHCR continues to be in charge of the entire asylum determination process because a national legal framework is still lacking. In particular, it triggered equivocal transnational dynamics.
monitoring the state and civil liberties in Europe.
In fact, relations between external actors, CSOs and Tunisia's administration vary according to the issue at stake: On immigration, civil society and international actors tend to join forces to lobby state institutions for progressive reforms. Warsaw: FRONTEX. The studys participants were all transferred to CPRs, 38% of them in Turin, 27% in Romes Ponte Galeria, 12% in Milan, 10% in Gradisca, 5% in Brindisi, and 3% in Caltanissetta.
Although emigration and diaspora politics have stayed central to Tunisia's development agenda, little has changed for Tunisian emigrants since 2011. This has ultimately reinforced policy stalemate on migration. Vice-versa, Tunisian CSOs rely on their international networks to exercise transnational pressure on national political actors. From the outset, migration and revolution were intrinsically linked: the emigration of young Tunisians skyrocketed in early 2011 as Tunisia's security apparatus and border controls fell apart, with 28,000 Tunisians arriving at Italy's shores compared to around 1,700 yearly over the 2000-2010 period.
The revolution has opened up the Tunisian state apparatus and civil society to external cooperation. Indeed, more inclusive policy processes created frictions between different Tunisian ministries. Number of Tunisian citizens arriving in Italy by sea, Number of people intercepted in Tunisian waters by the Tunisian Coast Guard, Socioeconomic profile of Tunisian migrants.
Italy was condemned in 2016 by the European Court of Human Rights for arbitrarily detaining Tunisians in the Khlaifia et al vs. Italy case in the Lampedusa reception centre and on board of navy ships-cum-detention sites near Palermo, without any available remedies. The authors note that this lack of information is a way to speed up removals. Italys eight functioning CPRs (the six previously listed, plus Macomer in Sardinia and Palazzo San Gervasio in Potenza) have higher occupancy rates that their normal capacity, with the highest overcrowding rate (almost 400%) in Milan. Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles. buzzword, , .
A public health emergency was used to ensure that migrants would not escape authorities control, as had happened in July 2021, when 200 people left quarantine, deeming the conditions they were held in to be inhuman.
[8] Lixi 2018 ; Roman, Emanuela.
Indeed, during demonstrations in January 2011, the rights to emigrate and to participate in the polity from abroad were core demands of the revolution.
[6] After 2011, Tunisian political leaders needed to legitimize decisions in front of an electorate. In this context, the lacking inter-institutional coordination by the SEMTE has opened up space for other ministries to pursue their own interests on migration.
Has EU Policy?" [11] Zemni, Sami.
2019.
This conflict has jeopardized cooperation with other actors institutional and societal which has obstructed reform processes such as elaborating an asylum law or politically validating the national migration strategy.