The Struggle for the Soul of Latin America's Left. What Is a Mass Grave?
Nicole Thomas is a civilian with the U.S. Army and the Division Chief for Strategy and Policy in the Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office. In the 1920s the Soviet Union established the Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous region within the borders of Azerbaijan. Video footage demonstrated that forces from both sides lacked training and proficiency in the application of passive defense techniques. Despite the 1994 cease-fire agreement, there have been 7,000 breaches. However, the DoD must not simply look at tactical lessons learned from this conflict. After initial UAS strikes decimated Armenian positions and opened gaps in defensive lines, the small groups of Azeri operators were able to seize key terrain with minimal resistance. Unlike previous skirmishes and cease-fire violations, the warfare that erupted in September 2020 included post-modern characteristics and multi-domain combat operations. This includes developing training and enabling flexible concepts of employment that support organizational flattening, seeking efficiencies in the modification of TTPs, and facilitating quick decisions at all levels.
Furthermore, UAS can potentially provide uninhibited ISR from above defensive positions. Armenias Buk and Tor-M2KM air defenses likely downed a few drones, but they were deployed late in the conflict, limited in number, and vulnerable to attack themselves. How Will President-Elect Yoon Manage The South Korea U.S. Alliance And North Korea? [1] Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict. Forces were regularly observed operating in the open, remaining static or moving slowly, poorly camouflaged, and aggregating together in tight groups. At the onset of the conflict, Azerbaijan leveraged Soviet-era AN-2 biplanes to deceive and expose Armenian air defenses. [12] Ron Synovitz, Technology, Tactics, And Turkish Advice Lead Azerbaijan To Victory In Nagorno-Karabakh, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/technology-tactics-and-turkish-advice-lead-azerbaijan-to-victory-in-nagorno-karabakh/30949158.html.
CPT Kendall Gomber is a U.S. Army Military Intelligence Officer serving as the Policy Integration Intelligence Planner at the Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office. [15] Andrew Bowen and Cory Welt, Azerbaijan and Armenia: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, CRS Report No.
Ethnic Armenians in the local area verified these reports and highlighted that strange men, not Armenians had established a presence in the town. He is a prior U.S. Army Aviation Officer and a contributing author of the Department of Defenses first ever C-sUAS strategy and implementation plan.
[17] State actors that lack the air capability and capacity of peer competitors will similarly look to identify weak points where UAS can be applied to gain asymmetric advantage. These tactics demonstrated a variety of similarities to NATO operations in Afghanistan, where U.S. Special Operations Forces use unmanned platforms and laser range finder/designators to direct laser-guided and precision munitions onto targets, or sparkle targets to aid in directing unguided munitions onto target. Capacity will always be a challenge with defensive systems, so it is necessary to leverage attack operations that can potentially reduce threats and divert adversary resources. In the end, it would be a combination of Azerbaijans alliance with Turkey and its nearly fifteen years of economic growth as a result of the BTC pipeline, that would give it an advantage vis--vis Armenia by rapidly improving military training, readiness, and capability. Between 2006 and 2019, Azerbaijan invested nearly $29 billion in its military compared to Armenias roughly $6 billion during that same period. But after two decades of little movement toward reconciliation, Azerbaijan and Armenia would remain in a battle over the region, killing more than 20,000 people, displacing millions, and solidifying the ethnic Armenians hold within Azerbaijan. Forces were regularly observed operating in the open, remaining static or moving slowly, poorly camouflaged, and aggregating together in tight groups.
Todays battlefield is no longer linear. For the first time in recorded history, nearly all battle damage was inflicted by unmanned platforms. We are committed to providing our clients with exceptional solutions while offering web design and development services, graphic design services, organic SEO services, social media services, digital marketing services, server management services and Graphic Design Company in USA. The regional implications of Turkish involvement in the South Caucasus are far more compelling than just its apparent support ofsome may assert control overAzerbaijani sovereignty. The right system with the wrong TTPs for employment will be ineffective. R46651 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46651. DoD must prepare the Joint Force to operate in a communications-degraded and/or denied environment.
Whats Behind the Spike of Violence in El Salvador? [15] Given the rapid buildup of equipment, subject matter experts have expressed doubts that Azeri forces could have received an appropriate level of training and proficiency on the new equipment in a timely enough manner to conduct such lethal strikes.
Our allies and partners are key enablers. While it is safe to assume that they will lack the air power of a state actor, they can achieve tactical air superiority in limited circumstances. Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker,. Opponents like the US and Russia or China would have to have a very different plan as the level of sophistication between the combatants would be more similar than dissimilar, though if one side could pull off a "Pearl Harbor" surprise attack with little if any prior notice, the fighting could resemble a 1967 June War character. But to understand the underlying reasons for the current conflict, one must look back to the root of hostilities and to the role of other powers in the region.
[13] Shaikh, "The Air And Missile War In Nagorno-Karabakh".
Second, the Department will leverage existing science and technology investment to expedite the development of innovative solutions through partnerships with industry, academia, and research facilities. In the 1920s the Soviet Union established the Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous region within the borders of Azerbaijan. Neither has an air force that could realistically compete with the United States Air Force. Russia and China can be expected to augment manned systems with ISR missions and targeting support while also engaging in manned-unmanned teaming.
And it would be this lesson, along with new military capability and a powerful ally, that would set the conditions for the September 2020 conflict.
A reasonable conclusion is that Turkey likely played an expanded role in the attacks on Armenian forces and equipment.
The use of UAS, particularly by Azerbaijan, included a range of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, as well as unmanned aerial attack operations involving a variety of different platforms and munitions. In assessing the lessons that we have identified in this conflict, it is important to consider the overall context in terms of making a realistic determination as to the applicability of these lessons to U.S. military planning. Together, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia established the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which connects the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.
The improved capability of UAS combined with decreasing price points has lowered the barrier for entry into conflict in the air domain. Individual operators lack the bandwidth to deal with UAS swarms, so automatable decision support tools that provide any sensor, best shooter solutions are critical. [3] Armenian forces faced a persistent threat of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that could attrite traditional defenses and minimize their overall defensive capability. Joint C-UAS training must incorporate the use of analog systems and redundant communications. Turkish control over Azerbaijans armed forces is so deeply embedded that there are reports of Azerbaijani military officers being fired at Ankaras behest after criticizing the extent of Turkish involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Department of Defense, Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/07/2002561080/-1/-1/0/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-COUNTER-SMALL-UNMANNED-AIRCRAFT-SYSTEMS-STRATEGY.pdf, by Program on Extremism / Combating Terrorism Center / NCITE, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict, https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=MS.MIL.XPND.CD&country=ARM,AZE,GEO. David Hambling, "The Magic Bullet Drones Behind Azerbaijans Victory Over Armenia", Forbes, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2020/11/10/the-magic-bullet-drones-behind--azerbaijans-victory-over-armenia/?sh=762b36f5e571.
While it is safe to assume that they will lack the air power of a state actor, they can achieve tactical air superiority in limited circumstances. This economic alliance provided Azerbaijan with an economic advantage over its neighbors as its per capita income reached its peak of $7,190 in 2011, compared to Armenias $3,526 and Georgias $4,022. Mark Episkopos, a reporter for National Interest, highlights Turkeys potential role in the war: There is a mounting body of evidence that the Azberbaijani war effort was planned, coordinated, and in large part executed by Turkey. Going forward, what steps should the Department take in response to ensure that it has a trained Joint Force with a suite of solutions that can protect personnel, facilities, assets, and missions from both current and future UAS threats? Imagine the disfunction of hundreds of swarming suicide drones attacking air defense systems, air bases, etc. What the United States Military Can Learn from the Nagorno-Karabakh War, By Nicole Thomas, LTC Matt Jamison, CAPT(P) Kendall Gomber, and Derek Walton, The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or. [16] Mark Episkopos, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Fresh Scars of War, The National Interest, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nagorno-karabakh-and-fresh-scars-war-174690.
position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. After decades as a frozen conflict, the Four Day War demonstrated to the Azeris that their strategic objectives could be achieved by force. World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=AZ-AM-GE, Hambling, "The Magic Bullet Drones Behind Azerbaijans Victory Over Armenia". This will include targeting support, employment of loitering munitions, and a range of reconnaissance and security operations. However, the DoD must not simply look at tactical lessons learned from this conflict. During the early years of Azerbaijans independence from the Soviet Union, the countrys foreign policy pursued a pan-Turkism agenda. Neither [side] seems to have grasped the idea that even the most high-tech tank (or armored fighting vehicle) is only so much scrap metal if you do not have a trained and disciplined fighting force inside those vehicles.[14] Whether a lack of training or tactical discipline/patience, the cost to Armenia was immense. These improvised UAS were repurposed as decoys and flown to the front lines to force air defenses to give away their location and enable targeting by TB2s. What Does Arming an Insurgency in Ukraine Mean? An Expert Explainer on Indicators and Assessments, Mass Graves in Ukraine Should Be Treated as Crime Scenes and Urgently Secured. While an adversary may be unable to operate freely in the air domain across an entire area of operations, it may be able to achieve localized air superiority with the use of tactical UAS. As developed, the DoD strategy enables an array of potential technical solutions in order to address a wide variety of threats. Additionally, non-state actors such as terrorist groups will employ UAS in different ways than state actors. Specifically, the Department should continue to emphasize the development of layered, system of systems defenses. On September 27, 2020, intense fighting erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia when the Azeri military went on the offensive.
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Azerbaijans new independence created the need for it to have allies in the region early in its independence, which would do two very important things. Given the rapid buildup of equipment, subject matter experts have expressed doubts that Azeri forces could have received an appropriate level of training and proficiency on the new equipment in a timely enough manner to conduct such lethal strikes. With Russian peace-keeping efforts underway for at least the next five years, it remains unclear who will. Therefore, the operational and strategic choices each country made could be vastly different from a conflict between the U.S. and a near-peer. must be synchronized with materiel to maximize their effectiveness. [8] In the end, it would be a combination of Azerbaijans alliance with Turkey and its nearly fifteen years of economic growth as a result of the BTC pipeline, that would give it an advantage vis--vis Armenia by rapidly improving military training, readiness, and capability. Non-materiel solutions (e.g., doctrine, training, etc.) Military aid from Ankara included, but was not limited to, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, special forces commandos, and Turkish-affiliated Syrian mercenaries. UAS may not be the threat in terms of an end unto itself; these systems will also be employed as one component of a threat that includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-to-ground-missiles. First, it would enter into a 1992 agreement with Turkey that provided military aid, training, and participation in joint exercises; and second, in 1999, the two nations would further cement the Ankara-Baku alliance with the development of shared economic goals. Azerbaijans preparation for and execution of the recent conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh provides a blueprint for state and non-state actors alike to easily modernize their military forces and rapidly augment air operations. By contrast, Armenias UAS fleet consisted of smaller, indigenous systems focused on reconnaissance missions and is generally recognized as less capable than Azerbaijans fleet of foreign UAS. The armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the continued use and effectiveness of unmanned platforms in low-intensity conflict and its ability to transform smaller, less-funded militaries into more lethal warfighting organizations. Robert Bateman, No, Drones Havent Made Tanks Obsolete, Foreign Policy, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/15/drones-tanks-obsolete-nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan-armenia/. By leveraging these tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) with an unmanned fleet, Azerbaijan was able to destroy the vast majority of Armenian air and missile defense equipment and establish tactical air superiority with minimal risk to force or mission. The price tag for such technology is high for the moment as witnessed by the disparity between the availability of revenue between the two combatants in the conflict, but there's no reason that other "major nations" can't review the same process in assisting potential allies involved in "small wars". By contrast, Armenias UAS fleet consisted of smaller, indigenous systems focused on reconnaissance missions and is generally recognized as less capable than Azerbaijans fleet of foreign UAS. This move resulted in a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia with Russia initially playing a role by providing weaponry and mercenaries to both sides. They will leverage hard to detect nap-of-the-earth flight profiles while masking radar cross sections to exploit weaknesses such as non 360-degree sensor coverage and man-in-the-loop command and control (C2) systems. [17] Keri Chavez and Ori Swed, An Allegory of Cave: Innovation and Terrorist Drones, U.S. Army War College War Room, August 27, 2020, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/terrorist-drones/. Ethnic Armenians in the local area verified these reports and highlighted that strange men, not Armenians had established a presence in the town. How to Protect Mass Graves? To more effectively protect U.S. forces abroad, the DoD must make collaborative research, development, test, and evaluation efforts and integrated systems a priority. DoD must enable creativity and adaptability in C-UAS forces. Outposts and fighting positions in mountainous terrain can be identified and destroyed by UAS outfitted with modern sensor payloads and organic weapons. International Criminal Justice, Crime Semantics and the Role of the ICC in the Ukraine Conflict, International Law and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, Great-Power Competition Comes for Latin America, Opinion | The China Connection in Mexicos Illegal Economies, Brief: Climate Migration in Mexican and Central American Cities, Defending the City: An Overview of Defensive Tactics from the Modern History of Urban Warfare. Additionally, non-state actors such as terrorist groups will employ UAS in different ways than state actors. They will seek ways to multiply effects such as through SEAD. Portable, online courses will augment existing programs of instruction within the Military Services.
A number of reports indicate that Azeri special operations teams, also referred to as saboteur groups by both Baku and Yerevan, infiltrated Armenian territory and occupied vacant houses days before combat operations began. The DoD strategy also facilitates a three-pronged approach to keeping pace with a threat that is clearly evolving rapidly.
Shaan Shaikh and Wes Rumbaugh of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provided detailed analysis of how and why Armenian air defenses failed to counter Azeri UAS: The bulk of Armenias air defenses consisted of obsolete Soviet-era systems, like the 2K11 Krug, 9K33 Osa, 2K12 Kub, and 9K35 Strela-10. At only six days into the conflict, Azerbaijan already claimed to have destroyed 250 armored vehicles, a similar number of artillery pieces, and 39 air-defense systems, including a Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile system. LTC Matthew Jamison is a U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Officer serving as the Policy Integration Branch Chief at the Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office. The Department of Defenses first C-sUAS Strategy was approved in December 2020, establishing a framework for dealing with the C-sUAS challenge along a spectrum of hazard to threat in three distinct operating environments: homeland, host nations, and contingency locations. Countries such as Azerbaijan now have improved access to air power, which in turn has upended existing notions regarding traditional air dominance. An opponent whose air forces may be considered comparable to or weaker than its adversary will incorporate UAS to achieve an asymmetric advantage. Video also shows Azeri UAS processing multiple high-payoff and high-value targets and immediately engaging targets of opportunity (i.e., troops in the open and unarmored vehicles) after high-priority targets were destroyed. Between 2006 and 2019, Azerbaijan invested nearly $29 billion in its military compared to Armenias roughly $6 billion during that same period. TB2s flew too high for these systems to intercept even if they were able to detect these relatively small aircraft. Though decades old and intended to serve as traditional manned aircraft, the biplanes conversion to unmanned decoys allowed Azerbaijan to conduct low altitude flights into the highly contested environmentand more importantlyinto the weapons engagement zone (WEZ) of Armenian air defenses. Adversaries will employ electronic warfare systems to jam radars in order to increase the effectiveness of UAS attacks, particularly when conducting SEAD missions. To fully assess how the Department of Defense should respond to the lessons that have been identified from this conflict, it is important to consider whether and how the recently approved strategy addresses them in its current form. 
These tactics demonstrated a variety of similarities to NATO operations in Afghanistan, where U.S. Special Operations Forces use unmanned platforms and laser range finder/designators to direct laser-guided and precision munitions onto targets, or sparkle targets to aid in directing unguided munitions onto target. Among the deadliest and most effective was the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 which carries four MAM (Smart Micro Munition) laser-guided missiles. [7] The new revenue stream enabled Azerbaijan to increase investment in its military.
[14] Robert Bateman, No, Drones Havent Made Tanks Obsolete, Foreign Policy, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/15/drones-tanks-obsolete-nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan-armenia/. The United States military needs to heed the warning of Nagorno-Karabakh in order to effectively prepare for the battlefield of the future. The Best Path for Accountability for the Crime of Aggression Under Ukrainian and International Law, Looking for answers: accounting for the separated, missing and dead in international armed conflicts, Is Genocide Occurring in Ukraine? Keri Chavez and Ori Swed, An Allegory of Cave: Innovation and Terrorist Drones,, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/terrorist-drones/, Small Unmanned Aerial Systems and Tactical Air Control,. At the onset of the conflict, Azerbaijan leveraged Soviet-era AN-2 biplanes to deceive and expose Armenian air defenses. It is generally recognized that most advanced air and missile defense systems are not designed to defend themselves against the full spectrum of threats. The Nagorro-Karabakh conflict is an excellent example of what happens when one side has the support of a more sophisticated and better equipped allyand more importantly, the "usual" major actors stay out of the conflict. This is an indication that Azeri forces had a robust supply of Turkish air-to-ground missiles and Israeli loitering munitions. First, it directs proactive coordination with the intelligence community in order to identify intelligence requirements so that the Joint Force can stay ahead of the threat before it is demonstrated on the battlefield. Shaikh, "The Air And Missile War In Nagorno-Karabakh". A long, but simmering, territorial dispute set the conditions for the September 27 offensive, but it was the outsized role Turkey played in Azerbaijan that would ultimately tip the scales in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Robert Bateman, writing for Foreign Policy, asserts that while UAS are a force multiplier, many of the failures witnessed during the war can be attributed to poor training. [2] Russia ultimately brokered a 1994 cease-fire to reduce instability in the region. They will combine manned and unmanned teaming and swarm tactics to clutter the operational environment and attempt to overwhelm operators with decisions and engagement sequences. All of this is centered on an enterprise approach across the Department and beyond with the Joint C-sUAS Office in position to unify the overall effort. Though decades old and intended to serve as traditional manned aircraft, the biplanes conversion to unmanned decoys allowed Azerbaijan to conduct low altitude flights into the highly contested environmentand more importantlyinto the weapons engagement zone (WEZ) of Armenian air defenses.
A number of reports indicate that Azeri special operations teams, also referred to as saboteur groups by both Baku and Yerevan, infiltrated Armenian territory and occupied vacant houses days before combat operations began. Their Laws of War Manual Says So.
He is a graduate of the Secretary of Defense Strategic Thinkers Program at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. The inhospitality of the terrain is amplified when small areas of low ground within the rising terrain provide little vegetation for concealment. While the conflict took place between two state actors, they do not share the same capability as near-peer competitors to the United States.
[18] To fully assess how the Department of Defense should respond to the lessons that have been identified from this conflict, it is important to consider whether and how the recently approved strategy addresses them in its current form.
Employment of UAS provides a cost-effective mechanism to augment air capability.
She is a graduate of the United States Army War College. The attrition of forces and equipment by UAS led to a decisive Azeri victory. The DoD strategy builds the train, but the implementation plan drives it. Armenias Buk and Tor-M2KM air defenses likely downed a few drones, but they were deployed late in the conflict, limited in number, and vulnerable to attack themselves. Put another way, how will adversaries employ these UAS threats against the Joint Force? [4] Kevork Oskanian, Turkeys global strategy: Turkey and the Caucasus, Report, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011, p. 26.
DoD must develop comprehensive defense concepts that integrate offensive and defensive fires. It is worth noting that traditional rotary wing assets were not used during these attacks.
This is essentially an extreme example of mission command and is conceptually similar to how Special Operations Forces operate. The real question is how will a similar scenario play out when both sides are served by relatively equal technologies. Kevork Oskanian, Turkeys global strategy: Turkey and the Caucasus, Report, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011, p. 26. Shaan Shaikh, "The Air And Missile War In Nagorno-Karabakh: Lessons For The Future Of Strike And Defense", Center For Strategic And International Studies, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/air-and-missile-war-nagorno-karabakh-lessons-future-strike-and-defense. All indications point to Azerbaijan having acquired a substantial portion, if not all, of its TB2s from Turkey just prior to the onset of the war.
[12] After initial UAS strikes decimated Armenian positions and opened gaps in defensive lines, the small groups of Azeri operators were able to seize key terrain with minimal resistance.
Additionally, peers will employ complex attacks. This cease-fire allowed the Nagorno-Karabakh to achieve military and political independence despite being constrained within Azerbaijans borders. This is particularly applicable to fighting positions without appropriate passive defense measures (i.e., camouflaging, target hardening, etc.). [9] The Azeris developed an imposing UAS arsenal composed of Israeli loitering munitions, also known as suicide or kamikaze drones that included the Harop and SkyStriker. DoD must increase investment in non-materiel solutions. DoD must integrate conventional air defense systems with C-UAS defenses. See also Jules Jay Hurst, Small Unmanned Aerial Systems and Tactical Air Control, Air & Space Power Journal (Spring 2019). DoD must enable enhanced information sharing with our allies and partners and support the creation of interoperable solutions.