D-40. This generally occurs when the two arms of a double envelopment complete their linkup. Chapter 3 discusses using axis of advance, direction of attack, objectives, LD or line of contact, LOA, and time of attack.) D-24. The commander may use air assault and airborne forces to seize defiles or other critical terrain objectives to cut enemy LOCs. An encircled force may be operating under adverse conditions and may not have all of its ISR systems operating. Control measures for an encirclement are similar to those of other offensive operations, especially an envelopment, but with a few additional considerations. When encircled, soldiers under the firm control of their leaders can withstand the mental strain. Once the commander assigns defensive AOs and battle positions, preparations are the same as in the defense. D-60. They can also occur during combat operations as the result of different rates of advance by combat formations that face dissimilar degrees of enemy resistance and different terrain. Mobile, self-propelled weapon systems suit the needs of forces conducting shaping operations. The commander should integrate these assets to achieve the rupture. Figure D-2. He can also give the appearance that the force will make a resolute stand and await relief. Organization of Forces for a Breakout Operation. Although the resulting attack may be along a less-direct route or over less-favorable terrain, it is the best course of action (COA) because it avoids enemy strength and increases the chance for surprise. The squeeze technique uses simultaneous, coordinated blows on the enemy from various directions. The enemy must regard the efforts of this force as credible and a threat to the continuity of his maneuver plan. D-27. They usually result from the linkup of two encircling arms conducting a double envelopment. All units and vehicles carry the maximum supplies possible, with emphasis on carrying POL and ammunition. The preferred method is when the moving force has an assigned LOA near the other force and conducts the linkup at predetermined contact points. The squeeze technique promotes the enemy's confusion and rapid dispersion of combat power and prevents him from using his reserves in a decisive manner. It is a temporary measure designed to provide the attacking force additional time. D-19. The commander can use dummy radio traffic for the enemy to monitor or landlines that he might tap to convey false information. The commander applies the general defensive planning considerations outlined in Chapter 8 if the mission is to contain or fix the encircled enemy force in a given location. D-1. A successful diversion is important to the success of any breakout operation. If there are no identified enemy formations beyond the penetration, the rupture force may transition to a movement to contact. Armor, mechanized and motorized infantry, aviation, air assault, and airborne units are especially well suited for use as an encircling arm since they have the tactical mobility to reach positions that cut enemy lines of communications (LOCs). (Appendix B describes exfiltration as a tactical mission task.). This is especially true if the two armies are not both members of an alliance with established internationally standardized procedures, or if the units involved have not previously established the necessary procedures. Technical assets, such as JSTARS and EW systems, augment local security and locate those areas along the perimeter where the enemy is deploying additional forces. The enemy has not yet brought in sufficient combat power to encircle the friendly force in strength, and weak points exist in his perimeter. As a minimum, a commander uses boundaries; a line of departure (LD) or line of contact; time of the attack; phase lines; axis of advance or direction of attack; objectives; and a limit of advance (LOA) to control and synchronize the breakout.
As in other offensive actions, secrecy, deception, and surprise allow for success. Encircled units make their defensive positions as strong as possible given time and resource constraints. (See Figure D-4.) D-13. Either the anvil or the hammer can destroy the enemy. (See Figure D-10.) The commander counters enemy PSYOP by conducting defensive information operations. Encirclement of a friendly force is likely to occur during highly mobile fluid operations, or when operating in restricted terrain. He establishes primary and alternate linkup points for the moving forces near the LOA. D-48. The commander should direct the force's efforts to a point where the enemy might expect a breakout or relief effort. Commanders should plan to rotate the forces involved in reducing the encircled pocket to maintain constant pressure on the enemy. Usually the hammer, as the attacking element, accomplishes this task. He can achieve interior lines through central position (with operations diverging from a central point), from superior lateral LOCs, or greater tactical mobility. This minimizes friendly force losses and resource expenditures. D-78. The first phase is the actual encirclement that results in the enemy force's isolation. The presence of bypassed and encircled enemy forces on the flanks and rear of advancing friendly forces requires all-around security, which includes local security measures and security forces. Once the commander decides to destroy an encircled enemy force, he reduces the enemy as rapidly as possible to free resources for use elsewhere. If a rupture occurs, the diversion force commander must know the intent of the commander of the encircled force. D-26. After the encircled friendly force breaks out, it moves toward other friendly forces and links up with them. Planning considerations for the linkup of encircling forces, such as command and control relationships, are outlined later in this appendix. He may incorporate other CSS units into defensive positions in depth or around key facilities. Coordination of fire support before, during, and after linkup, including control measures. However, diversionary attacks need not always occur first. The commander should also obtain information from long-range surveillance units, stay-behind units, and special operations forces in the area. Encirclement Control Measures, D-8. The follow-and-assume force follows the rupture attack and is committed, as necessary, to maintain the momentum of the attack and secure objectives past the rupture. Initially, the rupture force is the decisive operation. Linkup between moving units is one of the most difficult operations. If the commander's mission is to reduce or destroy that same enemy, he organizes his forces for offensive action. Initially, the follow-and-assume force passes through the gap created by the rupture force. D-6. The main body follows the follow-and-assume force. The encircled commander also centrally controls his air defense assets, ensuring that the forward units have sufficient short-range air defense coverage. Morale and fighting capacity of the soldiers. When the enemy is attacking, an encircled friendly force that attacks deeper into the enemy rear may disrupt his offense and provide an opportunity for linkup from another direction. The organization of forces for an encirclement is similar to that of a movement to contact or an envelopment. D-70. It moves rapidly as a single unit on multiple routes in an approach march or road march formation immediately behind the follow-and-assume force, protected on its flanks by security elements. It contracts the perimeter as it delays back behind the main body. When that commander determines he is about to be encircled, he must decide quickly what assets stay and what assets leave.
(Chapter 2 describes using boundaries and phase lines. The commander should initiate a breakout attack as quickly as possible after the enemy encircles his force. (See Figure D-8.) The commander reestablishes unity of command. D-46. He must then make the necessary preparations. Designating a fire support coordinator for all fire support systems is a technique for centrally controlling his fires. The enemy may attempt to cut off the encircling force and extend his flank beyond the area of the friendly attack. The commander intends offensive encirclements to isolate an enemy force. Conservation and centralized control of available resources are imperative. If the commander uses both an inner and an outer encircling arm, he must establish a boundary between them. The commander of the encircled force establishes a perimeter defense. D-44. The escape route technique involves leaving one or more gaps in the inner encircling arm to entice the enemy to attempt a breakout. The commander conducts offensive information operations to assist the breakout attempt. D-23. Whenever possible, joining forces exchange as much information as possible before starting an operation. D-58. Even total, long-term isolation does not necessarily lead to decisive defeat of the encircled enemy. The encircled force commander may choose to exploit the success of forces conducting a diversion, or he may have to disengage them for use elsewhere in the breakout attempt. Stationary forces assist in the linkup by opening lanes in minefields, breaching or removing selected obstacles, furnishing guides, and designating assembly areas. Generally, engineers concentrate first on countermobility, then survivability. The commander must be seen frequently by his troops and display a calm and confident manner. The main body consists of the main command post, the bulk of the CSS, the unit's casualties, and some CS assets. He should place the boundary so that each element has enough space to accomplish the mission. Dispersal is difficult in a perimeter-type defense; therefore, the next best alternative is position hardening by constructing field fortifications. Each encircled German division took approximately one Allied division to maintain its isolation. D-56. D-64. The commander also conducts offensive information operations-such as psychological operations (PSYOP) and electronic warfare (EW)-against the encircled enemy force. If the enemy closely pursues the breakout force, the efforts of the rear guard may become the decisive operation for the encircled force. Some encircled units will be weakened, and if sufficient combat power does not exist to resource each of these forces, the commander must prioritize which ones to resource. Each unit clears its position to ensure that there are no enemy forces within the perimeter. Their personal conduct sets the example. A breakout is an offensive and a defensive operation. However, the commander's ability to use precision-guided munitions in mass may be limited by the ability of the combat service support (CSS) system to supply them. D-32. Therefore, at times the encircling force has to limit itself to less decisive measures. It is only feasible if a unit can sustain itself while isolated, although that sustainment can come from aerial resupply and enemy supply stocks. At lower levels, mortars from various units may be co-located under centralized control, especially if there are insufficient artillery assets. If the enemy force is not reduced and it can be resupplied, or it has access to considerable supply stocks, it continues to be a serious threat to the commander in future operations. It is usually better to take advantage of the enemy's extension and subsequent weakness by penetrating his thinly held front rather than overextending in an effort to completely outflank his position. The most effective reconnaissance combines ground, aerial, and surveillance systems to provide constant coverage and multiple assessments of enemy activities throughout the encircled area. D-51. D-9. However, there must also be unity of command for each encircling arm. Priority of support may be limited to the rupture force and the rear guard, with the remaining force keeping only sufficient transportation assets to move the wounded and critical assets and supplies. The commander uses his available ISR assets to provide information that increases the accuracy of his situational understanding and determines enemy weak points. Therefore, he designs his defense to maximize the capabilities of his available forces. He initiates a counterattack at the decisive moment and location as the enemy force attempts to penetrate the defensive positions. After the rupture force secures a gap in the enemy encirclement, the follow-and-assume force normally conducts the decisive operation until completing linkup operations with another friendly force. (See Figure D-6.) Continued Breakout by an Encircled Mechanized Division. It is the preferred method for destroying an encircled enemy force. He may also shorten the perimeter's length, which reduces the size of the area occupied by the encircled force. Additionally, the probability of a successful breakout increases measurably if another friendly force attacks toward the encircled force as it attempts to breakout. It involves great risk but may offer the only feasible COA under some circumstances. The commander exploits darkness and limited visibility during a breakout if his encircled forces have superior night-operations capabilities. If the success of a breakout attack appears questionable, or if it fails and a relief operation is not planned, one way to preserve a portion of the force might be through organized exfiltration. The commander establishes a LOA to prevent fratricide. The perimeter must withstand enemy pressure. Forces left in contact must conduct a vigorous delaying operation on the perimeter so that no portion of the rear guard gets cut off. The hammer and anvil technique employs a stationary blocking force as an anvil on one or more sides of the inner perimeter while other elements of the encircling force use offensive action as a hammer to force the encircled enemy force against the blocking force. This force must use surprise, mobility, and firepower to achieve a favorable combat power ratio over the enemy at the point of attack. Following the initial encirclement, the capture or destruction of the enemy force is methodical and thorough.
The encircled enemy attempts to discover intervals and take advantage of them as he tries to escape from or breakout of the encirclement. If friendly forces enjoy air superiority, they may initiate a breakout attack during daylight to fully exploit the capabilities of close air support. D-47. Early in an encirclement, there are gaps between or weaknesses in the enemy's encircling forces. This situation occurred in Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when an Israeli division isolated the Egyptian 3rd Army. Soldiers in the encirclement must not regard their situation as desperate or hopeless. Above all, the encircled force must maintain the momentum of the attack; otherwise, it is more vulnerable to destruction than it was before the breakout attempt. In this event, the commander assigns and prioritizes various be-prepared missions to the follow-and-assume force. He may use feints and demonstrations to deceive the enemy concerning the location and time of the decisive operation. (See Figure D-5.) D-66. The inner force must have enough space to fight a defensive battle to prevent the encircled force from breaking out. In most cases, reducing the enemy pocket requires using ground maneuver forces. Conversely, an enemy force isolated without adequate supplies either surrenders or faces containment by considerably smaller forces. Every encircled enemy unit reacts differently. The rear guard must also have enough engineers to conduct countermobility operations. However, the senior commander must be determined as quickly as possible. This requires flexibility and mobility by the rear guard. He adjusts such control measures during the operation to provide for freedom of action as well as positive control. He may choose to use soldiers from CSS units as fillers for combat units, although this action may affect his sustainment capabilities. Figure D-10. D-53. D-30. This forces the commander to operate with low levels of intelligence regarding enemy strengths, weaknesses, and intentions. However, sometimes the commander will not attempt a breakout until all other options fail. Engineers supporting flank security elements focus on conducting countermobility operations. D-17. This situation occurred when German forces occupied various fortified French ports after Allied armies liberated the rest of France in 1944. Unchecked, this fear can lead to a degradation in morale and discipline.
D-39. The encircled force does not have adequate terrain available to conduct its defense. Initially, some become demoralized and cannot offer any serious resistance. Aviation can rapidly bring additional firepower to bear on the encircling enemy force or rapidly move reaction forces to threatened locations along the defensive perimeter. As such, they are not a separate form of offensive operations but an extension of an ongoing operation. When feasible, the encircling force advances parallel to the enemy's direction of movement. The initial targets for these munitions are systems that present the greatest danger to the encircling force, such as the enemy's WMD, command posts, fire support and air defense systems, and field fortifications. D-22. The commander should not assign this force supporting shaping tasks, such as clear routes and fix bypassed enemy forces, if those tasks would dissipate its available combat power. Soldiers have an inherent fear of being encircled by the enemy. If the commander's mission is to contain or fix an isolated enemy, he organizes his forces for defensive action and arranges them around the enemy's perimeter. The encircling force must be approximately equal in size to this type of encircled force to fix or contain it. Generally, aviation assets fly out of the encirclement when it becomes small enough to allow the enemy's artillery to range throughout the area. The encircling force headquarters may name one of its subordinate units as the headquarters for an encircling arm. It attempts to reach defiles, bridges, and other critical points before the main enemy force reaches them. D-11. D-42. (Chapter 2 discusses the use RFLs, FFAs, and other fire support coordinating measures.). Typically, encirclements result from penetrations and envelopments, or are an extension of exploitation and pursuit operations. The commander's form of maneuver once his unit becomes encircled depends on his senior commander's intent and the factors of METT-TC, including the. However, the encircling force must maintain pressure on other encircled enemy forces to prevent them from reinforcing or supporting the threatened area. This technique is effective against battalion or smaller groups of encircled enemy forces. If the mission is to attack and destroy the encircled enemy force, he applies the planning considerations outlined in Chapters 3 and 5. An encircled force can continue to defend encircled, conduct a breakout, exfiltrate toward other friendly forces, or attack deeper into enemy-controlled territory. Fire support assets move as part of the main body and rear guard so security forces have adequate fire support. The commander should consider adjusting his task organization between phases to maximize his unit's effectiveness in each phase. If only dismounted infantry forces are available, the commander should establish small local reserves to react to potential threats. When a unit receives a follow and assume mission in a breakout, its commander must coordinate closely with the rupture force commander regarding the location of the gap, the enemy situation at the rupture point, and the enemy situation, if known, along the direction of attack past the rupture point. D-69. He reorganizes any fragmented units and places soldiers separated from their parent units under the control of other units. The five main methods for reducing an encircled enemy are fire strike, squeeze, hammer and anvil, wedge, and escape route. The commander shifts his priority of fires as required by METT-TC once the breakout occurs. As the enemy's perimeter contracts, the commander removes units from the inner perimeter and adds them to his reserve depending on the terrain and other factors of METT-TC. The enemy has difficulty following the movements of the breakout force during conditions of limited visibility. However, destruction is not guaranteed. If the follow-and-assume force becomes the encircled commander's decisive operation, it cannot allow itself to become bogged down. Command relationship and responsibilities of each force before, during, and after linkup. An encirclement operation usually has at least two phases-the actual encirclement and actions taken against the isolated enemy. It then becomes the decisive operation. D-73. If executing these support tasks is vital to the success of the breakout and resources permit, the commander should designate a separate follow and support force to perform these tasks. A commander may destroy encircled enemy forces by fires alone or by a combination of fire and movement. (Chapter 3 discusses the penetration as a form of maneuver.). Figure D-9. D-49. When one of the units involved is stationary, the commander usually locates the linkup points near the RFL/LOA. Therefore, given the availability of sufficient fuel, the commander uses armored and mechanized infantry units as his reserve. D-4. They take a great deal of time and usually slow an advance. The rear guard consists of soldiers and equipment left on the perimeter to provide protection for the rupture attack and any shaping operations, such as diversionary forces.
He may order his forces to occupy only key terrain from which they can strike at the encircled enemy to prevent him from concentrating forces and to further isolate him. He establishes a clear chain of command throughout the encircled force, reestablishes communications with units outside the encirclement, and adjusts support relationships to reflect the new organization.